



20 Nov 2024



Space @ Belgian Defence

Agenda

- Introduction
- The Seven Space Functional Areas
 - Current systems
 - Foreseen developments
- Focus on the War in Ukraine
- Conclusion
- Q&A




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
**GENERAL
CHANCE
SALTZMAN:**

“The world’s use of space is growing at an accelerating rate, making space simultaneously more important and more dangerous. The domain is no longer the benign expanse of the past. Counterspace threats continue to destabilize the environment and space-enabled attack increasingly holds the Joint Force and our homeland at risk”

The strategic context



Strategic
enabler for
Defence &
civil society




Vulnerable
technology
component



Essential
domain for
warfare
supremacy



Cheaper
access to
space



Proliferation
of disruptive
actors



Lacunary
international
law



Complex
surveillance




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Belgian Defence Space Strategic Objectives



Robust & secure access to space capabilities to support Ops & Intel



Contribution to protection of national and allied assets and stakeholders



Contribute to a Safe, Secure & Sustainable Outer Space for all space users




Cooperation with international stakeholders to apprehend and mitigate risks and threats


Space is contested

So What :

- Space threats come in many forms
- Space threats can be tackled in many ways



Launches since 1957




SPACEX

So What:


- Space is becoming more congested
- Space environment is fragile and evolves quickly

- More than 10,000 Satellites are currently active
- 2/3rd are from Starlink mega-constellation
- 30,000 debris of more than 10cm
- 600,000 debris of more than 1cm



2023 Space launch Zoom-in

Chinese Payloads	
Misc/Test/UI	42
Foreign	3
ISR	117
Scientific	5
SATCOM & Data Relay	20
Navigation	3
CSS Support	3
Weather	19
Spaceplane	1
Total	210



Russian Payloads	
Military UI	2
Foreign	3
ISR	8
Science/Civil	41
SATCOM	3
GLONASS	1
ISS Support	6
Weather	3
Total	67


So What:

- CHN is now a major player. Brings a lot of uncertainties in Space
- Space X is the main player in Space with the larger constellation
- EU is lacking behind*

Belgian Defence Space Strategic Objectives



Robust & secure access to space capabilities to support Ops & Intel



Contribution to protection of national and allied assets and stakeholders



Contribute to a Safe, Secure & Sustainable Outer Space for all space users





Cooperation with international stakeholders to apprehend and mitigate risks and threats



The Seven Space Functional Areas

The NATO definition of space



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
Space based ISR



CSO constellation



LUXEOSys - NAOS



NATO framework to share ISR products



EU framework to get EU ISR products



EDF Project



Space Based ISR Strategy

2023/2024

Current Capability

2025-2027

Gap Filler + R&D

Post 2028

Future Capability

Optical



Sensor improvement



Optical

Radar




Sensor improvement



Radar

RF

Not used



RF
FENSIE
DÉFENSE

μSat Project



SpaceX déploie dans l'espace Riri, Fifi, et Loulou

- Aim :
 - Procurement of a small constellation of SB RF-monitoring μSat
 - Enlarge the SB collection capabilities of GISS
 - Build-up the know-how within BEL DEF
 - Support BEL industry
- Way ahead :
 - Test campaign (Sept 24- Jan 25)
 - Redaction of the file (Q1 25)
 - Procurement process (Q2 25)
- Risks :
 - Tech not yet mature enough in BEL
 - Lack of manpower within DGMR to support the procurement process
 - Lack of personnel within CSCU for the analysis of the products
 - Delays linked to federal elections



GALO

- Aim :
 - Procure a constellation of multisensory μ Sat
 - EO, SAR and RF-monitoring
 - High revisit
 - Trains of satellites and Smart-tasking
 - Interdependence with French IRIS constellation
 - FRA High resolution vs BEL high revisit
 - Interdependence with APSS
- Way ahead :
 - NDA with FRA and start of bilateral discussions
 - R&D within the ESA framework
 - Smart-tasking and Intersatellite links
 - μ Sat to enable RF-monitoring
- Risks:
 - No allocated budget
 - Decoupling with FRA IRIS constellation
 - Imagery analyst population



Visual representation of SB ISR programmes and their relations with each other



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
SATCOM



EDF Project



KUR for Wideband SatCom




L/S	UHF	Civ Wideband (C, Ku)	Mil Wideband (X, Ka)
Satphones	GOVSATCOM P&S	EU Satcom Market	WGS
Inmarsat BGAN	EUROPEAN DEFENCE AGENCY	MELUSINA III	GovSat-1
EU Satcom Market	Hosted Payload EUTELSAT 36D 2024	LEO Solution TBD	GOVSATCOM P&S



WGS-11 (X, Ka)



EUTELSAT 36 D (UHF)



EU programme for secure SATCOM



Future anchor station in MeF



PNT






GALILEO FOR EU DEFENCE


EDIDP Project



EDF Project




Freq bands for GNSS




Galileo Constellation

SWx





Coronal Mass Ejection




False radar echoes


Rain Attenuation




Royal Observatory of Belgium - 2017




Ionospheric Scintillation



Solar Radiation Storm



Updated 2017 Sep 11 11:16:02 LTCT NOAA/SWPC Boulder, CO USA



ESA mission in L5

SSA telescope in Princess Elizabeth



High orbital density

In Antarctica, all high-inclination orbits (e.g., SSO) can be observed more frequently from a single place allowing for rapid cataloging of numerous space objects

International interest

Exotic locations such as Antarctica have been marked as interesting by existing networks and nations alike as the location is not common and allows for more frequent measurements




- Unique advantages for the SSA community
 - Geographic relevance for EU-SST
- Sovereign sensor = unique opportunity to learn about Space environment
- Site survey has been done and results are analysed
 - Technically feasible
 - Legal aspect = approved @ DG JUR
- Installation pending procurement initiation

Space Based Space Surveillance : SBSS project

- Feasibility study running via ESA GSTP framework
 - Determine the feasibility of SBSS
 - Draft the technical specifications
- Flagship ESA GSTP framework
 - Develop the Belgian space industrial base
 - Innovate in the field of space surveillance
 - Build an IOD by the end of 2027
- Potential follow-up :
 - Procurement of a small constellation by early 2030



NorthStar Earth and Space SBSS



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SEW




ODIN'S EYE 2


EDF Project

 **OIP**
Space Instruments

BEL Industry



USSF OPIR constellations (SBIRS + DSP)



Missile Warning chain





USSF Delta 4 logo



USSF OPIR DSP satellite

E
NSE

Belgian Space Security Centre - Roadmap



IOC criteria:

Minimum 5 FTE

Main tasks :

- SSA (2)
- NAVWAR (1)

FOC criteria:

Minimum 15 FTE



Main tasks :

- SSA (5)
- NAVWAR (3)
- Threat watch (2)
- Sensor Operation (2)

SSC : Space Security Centre
 IOD : In orbit Demonstration
 SBSS : Space-based Space Surveillance
 SSA : Space Situational Awareness
 NAVWAR : Navigation Warfare



Belgian Space Security Centre Structure



A photograph of two soldiers in camouflage uniforms working at computer workstations in a control room. The soldier in the foreground is seated and looking at a monitor, with his hands on a keyboard. The soldier in the background is also seated and looking at a monitor. The room is dimly lit, and there are several computer monitors and keyboards on the desks. A water bottle is visible on the desk in the foreground.

Focus on the war in Ukraine

Space in the Ukraine War : Before the War

Early 2022

15 Nov 2021

ASAT test



Strong increase
of GNSS
jamming East
of UKR



24 Feb 2022

Cyber attack on
Ground infra of
KA-SAT



7 Jan 2022

Cable cut
Svalbard



05 Feb 2022

Launch of
Cosmos 2553



Luch multiple
RPO



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Space in the Ukraine War : During the War

- Space as a sensor
 - Space-based ISR make the UKR war one of the most transparent battlefield
 - No need to own the assets
 - UKR supported by Western Countries and commercial actors
 - RUS supported by CHN (with exception of targeting Western Countries)
- Space as an enabler
 - SATCOM is a game changer
 - Starlink constellation allows massive data streams
 - Starlink terminal optimized SWaP allows decision advantage
 - GIS Arta as an example
 - Decision advantage = shorter OODA loop
 - Disruption of this strategic advantage
 - Offensive Counter Space RUS capabilities
- Space as a target
 - Space X, VIASAT, INMARSAT, EUTELSAT,... are commercial actors with a large contribution
 - Are they becoming legal targets ?
 - How reliable are they ?
 - ➔ Strategies for the integration of Commercial Space (US DoD, GBR, NATO (draft))



Space in the Ukraine War : Lessons learned so far


- Power of crowdsourced Situational Awareness
 - Not only based on military ISR
 - Not only SB-ISR
- Satellite-based technologies as a day to day tool for all troops
 - Down to tactical units
 - Evolution of the TTPs
- Access to space capabilities is more important than owning them
 - Multinational support
- Commercial assets are a game changer but what about their status (legitimate targets ?)
 - Commercial support
 - Need to set up a legal framework
- Developments in space technologies can foster new combinations of capabilities for mil purposes
 - Space technologies to enable MDO



Conclusion



Robust & secure access to space capabilities to support Ops & Intel



Contribution to protection of national and allied assets and stakeholders



Contribute to a Safe, Secure & Sustainable Outer Space for all space users



Cooperation with international stakeholders to apprehend and mitigate risks and threats

Any questions ?

